Search results

The minimum wage has been regarded as an important element of public policy for reducing poverty and inequality. Increasing the minimum wage is supposed to raise earnings for millions of low-wage workers and therefore lower earnings inequality. However, there is no consensus in the existing literature from industrialized countries regarding whether increasing the minimum wage has helped lower earnings inequality. China has recently exhibited rapid economic growth and widening earnings inequality. Since China promulgated new minimum wage regulations in 2004, the magnitude and frequency of changes in the minimum wage have been substantial, both over time and across jurisdictions. The growing importance of research on the relationship between the minimum wage and earnings inequality and its controversial nature have sparked heated debate in China, highlighting the importance of rigorous research to inform evidence-based policy making. We investigate the contribution of the minimum wage to the well-documented rise in earnings inequality in China from 2004 to 2009 by using city-level minimum wage panel data and a representative Chinese household survey, and we find that increasing the minimum wage reduces inequality – by decreasing the earnings gap between the median and the bottom decile – over the analysis period.

This chapter provides a statistical analysis of the determinants of attitudes toward foreigners displayed by Europeans sampled in Eurobarometer surveys in 1988 and 1997. Those who compete with immigrants in the labor market are more negative toward foreigners. An increased concentration of immigrants in neighborhoods increases the likelihood of negative attitudes. Racial prejudice exerts a strong influence on anti-foreigner sentiment. Greater racial prejudices, and the decline in the strength of educational attainment in reducing negative attitudes toward foreigners, contribute to the increased anti-foreigner attitudes between 1988 and 1997.

We review the role immigration amnesties have played in US immigration policy, placing them in the context of similar programs embarked upon by other nations. The theory of amnesties suggests rent-seeking, bargaining, and costs as reasons for a country offering an amnesty, often in conjunction with increased border controls, internal enforcement and employer penalties. We model an immigration amnesty in which the destination country has a formal sector employing only legal immigrants, an informal sector employing both legal and illegal immigrants, and open unemployment. The model focuses on the productivity enhancing effects of legalization, and establishes specific conditions under which unemployment, the informal sector and the formal sectors increase/decrease in size. Building on these insights, our empirical work examines Mexican migration to the US. We study who are migrants; among migrants, who are legalized via Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), and who are legalized via sponsorship of family or employer. Furthermore, to measure the impact of amnesty on welfare of migrants, we estimate earnings equations of various migrants groups.

Immigration to what is now the United States has been a contentious issue from the earliest days of the European settlement. Perhaps the earliest recorded incident of contention occurred over 350 years ago in 1654, when 23 Jewish refugees sought refuge into New Amsterdam, fleeing what they rightly believed would be the extension of the Portuguese Inquisition to Recife in Brazil. Peter Stuyvasant's objection to their settlement was rejected by the Dutch West Indies Company. The tension between those opposing further immigration on either social or economic grounds and those favoring it has continued over these three and a half centuries to this very day.

Early models of the functional distribution of income assume constant labor productivity among all individuals. Not until human capital theory developed did scholars take into account how productivity varied across workers. According to early human capital models, this variation came about because each individual invested differently in education and training. Those acquiring greater amounts of schooling and on-the-job training earned more. However, these models neglected why one person would get training while another would not. One explanation is individual heterogeneity. Some individuals are smarter, some seek risk, some have time preferences for the future over the present, some simply are lucky by being in the right place at the right time, and some are motivated by the pay incentives of the jobs they are in. This volume contains 10 chapters, each dealing with an aspect of earnings. Of these, the first three deal directly with earnings distribution, the next four with job design and remuneration, the next two with discrimination, and the final chapter with wage rigidities in the labor market.